Tag Archives: Philosophy

Foucault and Discourse


Foucault is what is known as a Genealogist and Archaeologist type philosopher. In his Genealogical phase, he looks at discourses throughout history, mainly around the time of the enlightenment up to the secular movements of humanism and discovers how there is always an episteme that preceeds our existence, or a knowledge structure, a truth that is sought after or aspired towards in the time of our lives, that we incorporate into our bodies.

Unlike the existentialists, who transformed Will and Desire into free will and subjective desire, as they were ‘I’ Philosophers, Foucault like Derrida is much more centrifugal, but instead of thinking about signs and how they endlessly and restlessly signify in meaning, Foucault looks at bodies in the same way.

According to Foucault, our sexual instincts are not so natural, unlike the conventional view of sexual instincts. He prioritises culture over biology.

Quote:We believe in the full consistency of instinctual life and imagine that it continues to exert its force indiscriminately in the present as it did in the past. But a knowledge of history easily disintegrates this unity, depicts its wavering course… We believe, in any event, that the body obeys the exclusive laws of physiology and that it escapes the influence of history, but this too false. The body is moulded by a great many distinct regimes.

Sexual instincts are not fundamental. Take child sexuality, which Foucault argues was ‘discovered’ in the 18th century. This is evidenced by the whole new literature on the topic, with precepts, medical advice, clinical cases, outlines for reform and plans for ideal institutions. Great measures were taken to eradicate masturbation, but it had completely the opposite effect, it intensified the desire for our own bodies. In short, the sexuality of the child was created by 18th Century discourse.

He has the same view of homosexuality. While discourse on sex had previously dealt solely with marriage—what one could and could not do within and without the bonds of marriage—discourse on sex came increasingly to focus on those who fell outside the category of marriage: children, homosexuals, the mentally ill, and so on. A distinction arose between violations of marriage bonds, which were seen as violations of the law, and violations of what was considered natural practice, which were seen as sick or demented.

Foucault sees the modern concept of homosexuality arising from a desire to see sexuality as a fundamental aspect of who we are. Before the 19th century, sodomy was simply regarded as a criminal act. Since the 19th century, sodomy has been regarded as just one manifestation of a person’s homosexuality. “Homosexuality” ceased to be associated with certain acts, and became associated with a person’s identity, with his soul. One’s sexuality became a key to interpreting one’s personality and one’s behavior. Rather than work to eliminate homosexual acts, the growing discourse around homosexuality saw these acts as constitutive of a person’s identity.

Instead of sex being a desire, the desire for sex as an object was born out of discourse, out of truth. Instead of thinking of bodies and their pleasures, we should instead think of pleasure and its bodies.

On the one hand, the body does not exist like an idea, but it’s also not like a thing. It’s always being pulled out of itself, toppling forward into newly opened spaces, being drawn across boundaries. The body is not solidity, it is more of a force. Foucault, like Derrida, is a materialist, but in a very special sense.


There is a deeper reality to which can be true, rather than langue, or an epistemic framework, one that is not a thinking force. He is of course, talking about power. Power is not strictly only about wars and battles, for Foucault there is power over bodies and power of bodies.

Power over bodies is the power that invests in power relations, forces it to carry out tasks, perform ceremonies whereas power of bodies is the body’s own power, the source of Will and Desire.

Foucault observes the penal system and questions whether or not the ideal of reform is actually occuring, or if delinquency has emerged, prisons seek to grind meaning out of bodies, it normalises bodies. Just like the quest against masturbation, prison succeeds even though it fails to eradicate crime, there is a mastery of the body’s forces that is more than the ability to conquer them.

He rejects the Marxist view of progression through history towards an ideal and instead uncovers an anarchistic proliferation of forms over and above anyone’s deliberate aims or goals.

Foucauldian Feminism

Foucault’s work on power has been used by some feminists to develop a more complex analysis of the relations between gender and power which avoids the assumption that the oppression of women is caused in any simple way by men’s possession of power. On the basis of Foucault’s understanding of power as exercised rather than possessed, as circulating throughout the social body rather than emanating from the top down, and as productive rather than repressive, feminists have sought to challenge accounts of gender relations which emphasize domination and victimization so as to move towards a more textured understanding of the role of power in women’s lives.

Some feminists have also found Foucault’s contention that the body is the principal site of power in modern society useful in their explorations of the social control of women through their bodies and sexuality.

One of the distinct advantages of Foucault’s understanding of the constituted character of identity is, in Judith Butler’s view, that it enables feminism to politicize the processes through which stereotypical forms of masculine and feminine identity are produced. Butler’s own work represents an attempt to explore these processes for the purposes of loosening the heterosexual restrictions on identity formation. In pursuing this project she argues that Foucault’s characterization of identity as constructed does not mean that it is completely determined or artificial and arbitrary. Rather, a Foucauldian approach to identity production demonstrates the role played by cultural norms in regulating how we embody or perform our gender identities. According to Butler, gender identity is simply ‘a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being’

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Ontic Philosophy Forum

Ontic Philosophy Forum
Ontic Philosophy Forum


Come and join my new forum! I hope to create an awesome resource of philosophy, economics, politics, feminism and spirituality topics there.


We can make it in to whatever we want!



Happy new year 2017! This is a brand new forum. Please feel free to post and open threads. This is mainly a philosophy related forum. The more topics that are discussed, the more sections will be opened and the forum will begin to form it’s own identity. Ontic Philosophy Forum encourages the creation of threads and posts that are in the form of beginners guides. If the topics are more complex, please be as informative as possible. You can either start a debate, discussion, conversation or you can watch as others do so.

Welcome to Ontic Philosophy Forum.

I’m Nemus and I am the admin for the site. I am interested in philosophy and I was kind of fed up with discussions on YouTube, twitter, Facebook etc, as they either descended into irrelevance  and were not enjoyable anymore and I was looking for a medium that was more about writing and text as a means of conveying what I thought. I find forums to be much better for finding like-minded people.

Please make suggestions! Form groups that I can create in the admin control panel, if you want to create a group, please specify what the groups name is and what it’s about, how members can join and then get to it!

The main qualities I am looking for from this forum-

  1. Active members
  2. Quality threads that resemble beginners guides to philosophy, economics, politics and sociology (some psychology too)
  3. Quality conversations (it’s not always a debate you know!)
  4. A helpful community of members

What you can expect from me

  1. I will always remain impartial and indifferent when it comes to moderation
  2. I will discuss whatever is on the forum with any member
  3. I will protect the forum from spam attacks
  4. When the situation arises where conflict may lead to an unhappy mood on the forum, I will try to handle it in a civilised manner
  5. Warnings will be verbal, if problems escalate, then a suspension will be implimented, then a ban.

What constitutes bad behaviour?

This is usually an arbitrary thing to define on a forum. Basically – don’t annoy people! No one likes a sea lion troll – the sort of person who makes it everyone else’s job to spoon feed them day and night, coming across with ‘concern’ but being passive aggressive. It’s not cool. Don’t threaten members, don’t reveal personal information about yourself or others here, don’t share anything that you shouldn’t, like illegal material, copyrighted shit etc, etc.

Also, this should be obvious – no spamming. This will lead to an instant ban.

I will always try to explain the best way to resolve the problems when they arise – it usually involves taking a few days off from the forum – that usually does the trick. Talking about philosophy can seem personal sometimes, if you feel agitated, just relax and take some time to reflect. The forum will be here when you return.

I mostly want to see members sort out their own conflicts, I will only intervene if the threads descend into irrelevance. Unless you can prove a point while being provocative, then you will be warned about your actions.

On a lighter note

I think most forums go wrong by not analysing this behaviour – I think these sorts of interactions should be dicussed and I hope we can review the way people behave in an intellectual way.

Most of all though – be a secret gardener. Don’t worry about people not responding to your posts, most people who like your stuff probably have nothing to add, so when youget a thread with what seem like negative comments, just remember that they are not representitive of everyone on the forum. Please don’t make a ‘I’m fed up with this forum and all the people in it’ kind of thread, it’s very painful to read those sorts of threads and they never go anywhere.

Enjoy the forum!

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Anti-Natalism | Ethics |

What is Anti-Natalism?

The phrase from the German pessimist, Arthur Shopenhauer best encapsulates what anti-natalism is all about – ‘Better never to have been born’. In more recent times, South African philosopher, David Benetar released a book in 2006 entitled ‘Better Never to have Been : The Harm of Coming into Existence’.

To better explain what these phrases mean, we have to start from an existential position (one that starts from existence and all meaning is a posteriori, existence preceeds essence) that suffering, pain and death are the only qualities of life that any one person, animal, or any form of sentience can be guaranteed to experience during a life time and that given this is true we begin to base our ethics in a negative utilitarian sense.

Unlike positive utilitarianism which holds the maxim, ‘I should act if and only if my actions lead to happiness of others’, negative utilitarianism reverses this and asserts ‘I should act if and only if my actions lead to less harm and suffering.’

We also need another existential premise that only a living being who has been born, any form of sentience that is, is capable of desire and valuing. Needs are created whenever a new sentient being is born, they need to eat, have shelter, clothing, clean water and then they develop desires as they get older and will consume, produce and will eventually grow older and older and experience pain and suffering, as well as satisfaction. Satisfaction always leads to more desire, desire is never fulfilled.

As for other sentient beings that are other than human, mainly insects for example, they often live very short lives that have no purpose other than to reproduce and they die either immediately, through starvation, or worse, they become food for other animals.


Anti-Natalism tackles the problem of over-populating the planet. There are as of 2015, around 7.3 billion human beings on the planet. The principle concern is resources. Poverty and inequality is the highest and most divided in human history, climate change is irreversible and the potential for war, famine, climate refugees, lack of employment and many other long term problems that offer fewer and fewer prospects of progress and improvement are likely to unfold in ways that are beyond our control.

Basic assertion

Given that there are no guarantees that the future will hold positive prospects and that no individual can possibly change the world on their own, survival becomes difficult without passing on our genes. Given that sentience is the only thing that can create value, need and desire, we can’t say that a non-existent being who is not yet concieved through sexual reproduction has any say, that the desire to reproduce is a selfish (or rather autonomous) decision on behalf of the would-be-parent of the one who is yet to be conceived.

The basic principle of Anti-Natalism then, is that it is unethical given the absolute guarantee of suffering and inability to prevent harm, to bring a sentient being into existence.


The argument is best shown using a kind of game theory, it’s called a zero-sum game. It’s very similar to Prisoners Dillemma, so each player has to act rationally.

[Image: benatar-asymmetry15122011eh.png]


Scenario A where x exists shows how the presence of pain is bad and how the presence of pleasure is good. Okay so far, nice and simple.

Scenario B however, where x does not exist reveals how pain is absent and this is a good – obviously as x does not exist and so can’t be harmed in any way. Then we have to consider whether or not the absence of pleasure is good or bad. Well, given that x doesn’t even exist it can’t even experience it.

Before I explain the conclusion, let’s say we have a doughnut that we enjoy and it gives us pleasure and let’s say someone who is torturing us by sticking knives under our toe nails gives us pain. Not hard to see how this gives us good and bad. Now let’s say we didn’t eat a doughnut, we are neither in pleasure but we are not in pain either. Let’s say we are not being tortured any more, or we were never tortured – that’s always a good, or more good than before.

So x not existing to eat the doughnut and not existing to have knives under toe nails gives us an assymmetry. Not having pleasure is niether good nor bad, it’s just not bad.

Usual counter-argument

Absence of pleasure is bad! Is usually the way people repond, but think about it for a moment. Not being in pain is good, obviously, but not eating a doughnut is niether harmful, nor is it pleasureable, it’s just not bad.


The assymmetry looks perplexing at first. The zero-sum game of pleasure being absent as bad, does not contemplate how a non-existent being is incapable of desiring a doughnut in the first place and so creates sentience in the belief that procreation allows others to experience pleasure and this comes purely from a selfish decision to procreate. It does not, cannot, come from the desire of a never existent being.

By not bringing someone into existence, we certainly don’t immediately improve the over all suffering as that is beyond our control in the most general sense. What we can do however, is not add to the problems. This is the basic principles of anti-natalism.

Pleasure outweighs pain!

Another objection is that if we are lucky, we can tally the goods with the bads and a life with more goods was probably worth living. Anti-natalism does not deny the existence of goods, but it can’t guarantee it, it can only guarantee that we will eventually all suffer at some point and die. In developing countries and in more poverty stricken areas of the developed world, pain and suffering are more likely and so pro-creation definitely does more harm than good as parents have to provide, thier life becomes a burden. On the other hand, better off people tend to consume more stuff than a mass of poorer people and this puts a strain on resources for everyone. Rich or poor, no one can avoid climate change, pollution, disease and war if it occurs.

The assymmetry contains the maxim of ‘better never to have been born’ as not harming and not having pleasure are both good and not bad. Existing contains bad and good and so loses the game of rational choice.

Other objections

Traditional thinking within any society is that having children is what we live for and not having them would make life meaningless. This is easily tackled, what I call the Simpsons argument – ‘Wont someone please think of the children?” when we remember that sentience creates value and although the desire to pro-create was around before we ourselves were born, it is only a desire. We can choose to have or not to have children, but if we do it is because of our own selfish choice. A non-existent being does not have choice, it has no say until it is born.

Relative problems need relative solutions

While we could take negative utilitarianism and anti-natalism to the extreme of ending life gracefully, not only not bringing more life into existence, but to end humanity for it’s own good, I want to stress that the problem is only a problem while it is a problem.

If people stopped having more children, then resources would not be as strained as they are and will become. If people stopped producing more children in poor countries, they would not be so easily exploited by global capitalism. If women stopped having children for now, it actually serves as a positive feminist issue in that it eradicates the roles of a woman as a mother through natural obligation. If we stop having children, we can do more with our own lives instead of trying to raise children in an increasingly uncertain economy. If population started to drop, there would be less panic as a whole. If it dropped low enough and there was too few of us and there was enough to go around and the environment was stable, then by all means – have children again, but within the limits of what is possible to sustain.

A here and now solution

Not acting is a form of action. This is a simple solution that anyone can understand and it’s something that can be done by everyone to stop adding to the global problems and to generally improve life for themselves and others.

Hope that was clear enough, I want to remind everyone I am not trying to offend anyone and it really is up to yourselves whether you choose to have or not have children. If you do, make sure it’s for the right reasons.

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Spirits of the Goetia are portions of the human brain | Aleister Crowley |


I have seen this topic come up numerous times on many blogs and  forums. The problem stems from Aleister Crowley in the section of the Goetia ‘The Initiated Interpretation of Ceremonial Magic’.

Page 17 of Goetia – Published by Weiser, Crowley:

The spirits of the Goetia are portions of the human brain.

I am not approaching this quote to say spirits are not real, I am aware that Crowley is not an authority when it comes to evocation. I am aware of the differences between physical and visible evocation and the general mental masturbation. I am not an expert on these matters however and so I am not approaching this quote with the intent of proving/disproving the existence of spirits, nor am I claiming that I know how to evoke spirits.

All I will say in that regard to this quote, is that Crowley argues that illusions appear in experience and are real. An illusion does not qualify as non-existent or not-real, it’s just a different kind of real. Without complicating the main objectives of this thread, I will bring up the realism of John Searle. To Searle, there are four kinds of real – ontologically objective (exists independent of experience), ontologically subjective (exists dependent on experience), epistemically objective (knowledge that is independent of experience) and epistemically subjective (knowledge dependent on experience). I would say that Crowley is arguing a form of ontological subjectivity in his interpretation, that the effects occur through experience. This is why Crowley resists calling the illusion part of realism in my opinion and instead uses Kant’s transcendental idealism to say that the spirits are active components or processes of our perception – things in themselves – that are capable of knowing things prior to experience, or sorting out knowledge. I have left the component of will out for now, more on that after I have deconstructed his interpetations.

An illusion is an effect of a mutiple contingent or necessary phenomena occuring in a constant conjunction that would not occur if the mutiple components were to be observed in isolation. In this regard, self and self-awareness is an illusion. Our bodies are made up of complex components that by themselves, produce no self, but if they are working in constant conjuction they produce the illusion of self, identity and consciousness. When illusions are understood in this way, it is absurd to extract the claim ‘Crowley says spirits are not real’ from this quote. If spirits are not real because they are an illusion, then we are not real.

Anyway, enough of that. Reading through his essay reveals many components that people seem to leave out (conveniently) when discussing this particular quote, it usually appears in isolation, which in my book is cherry picking and quote mining. Taken with the context of the rest of the essay, Crowley is arguing for the validity of illusions as real things.

What is of interest to my inquiry here, are the terms Crowley uses in the same section of the Goetia that reveal possible links to general philosophy not normally considered of use in occult studies or practices. It is my belief that Crowley and a few occultists of Theosophical creed, were using the metaphysics of their time and not from actual manifestations that occur during a ritual. For reasons that will become clearer later on in regards to the influence of German idealism on Crowleys’ explanation, it may be worth pointing out that the word for ‘mind’ in German is the same as ‘spirit’. In Hegel’s ‘The Phenomenology of Spirit’, the title has on occassion been interpreted as ‘The phenomenology of mind’.

So with the foreword serving as a disclaimer of what this inquiry hopes to achieve and what it doesn’t.

Cause and effect

Crowley uses Herbert Spencer to say that if illusions exist, they are evidence at least of some cause. Crowley then asserts that this is a fact. He then uses the term Akasha, from Hinduism – which means something along the lines of ‘essence’ the first material substance which came from an astral world. Not much to go on here, but there’s more later on that gives us a better scope of influences. For now though, we need to understand the foundations of philosophy and how views have changed over time before Crowley.

A very brief history of the foundations in philosophy

Medieval dogma, modern philosophers from Descartes to Locke, all presumed an a priori realm. Much like Plato’s forms. They also assume that the cause is greater than the effect, or that it must contain at least an equal amount of the parts contained in the material object. This dualism was taken down by George Berkeley, who claimed that material substances are dependent on the existence of minds and this led to idealism. These philosophers believed that particulars were transcendent, they came out of something beyond reality. Spinoza and Leibiniz then came along with immanence, or pantheism/panentheism which sees reality as all in God, but God is greater than nature, we and all material things are finite modes of an infinite God. Immanance means there is no beyond, if there is an astral plane for instance, it would still be a part of this universe/reality/existence, but God or the essence would still be greater than all of these modes. Leibniz also believed there is a ‘Monad’ that contains a history and can percieve reality from it’s own perspective, humans were the only material things that are composed of many monads, that could reflect on their content.

Then came along Hume, who said that causes can’t be known. What is here and now is so remote from it’s original source that we only ever see a constant conjunction and that ideas and impressions come from the senses in this world and we were not as Descartes and Locke, Berkeley, Spinoza and Leibniz claimed, that God was percieving through us. He took Lockes tabula rasa (blank blackboard) and explained how we can only ever have matters of fact that others have discovered and which are self defining, or we have relations of ideas.

Immanuel Kant took what Hume said and tried to debunk him. In doing so he discovered an active part of human cognition that was in his terms ‘synthetic a priori’ knowledge that is a thing-in-itself, a ‘transcendental idealism’. This has no connotation of alternative realism in the mystical sense, it is referring to an active component within cognition and perception that can recognise patterns before they are complete, we can know something without having prior experience of it.

Back to Crowley.


Like Berkeley, Crowley explains how Fichte says the ‘phenomenal Universe is the creation of the Ego’ to which Crowley interprets as the means the third eye ‘in the brain’. He says this can be assimilated by Realism but that we ‘have no need to take the trouble’. He says all ‘sense impressions are dependent on changes in the brain’ and that illusions are as real when classed as ‘phenomena dependent on brain-changes’.

This puts him in the same transcendentalism as Berkeley, but as he has referenced Fichte, a German idealist who was after Kant and Hume, he is not strictly speaking an idealist, it’s a much more subtle version of it.

He then includes the application of ‘will’ as well as a combination of objects and practices, including the mind which are required to perform ceremony.

He explains how the perfumes and scriptures produce ‘unusual brain changes’ and the mind ‘projects back into the phenomenal world’.This passage is perhaps the most revealing of Crowley’s metaphysics. Akasha then, it a form of will – the essence is the will.

Fichte claims that ‘the essence of an I lies in the assertion of one’s own self-identity, i.e., that consciousness presupposes self-consciousness. Such immediate self-identity, however, cannot be understood as a psychological fact, nor as an act or accident of some previously existing substance or being.’ Kant, while smashing the rationalists to pieces and following the limitations of Hume’s empriical scepticism, did allow for two worlds to exist. One of experience, phenomena, which is the world we occupy in material existence and another world that was intelligible, beyond our capabilities of understanding – the things in themselves that occupy the noumenal realm, which is our active perception that allows us to experience the material world.

Kant explained that because the ‘thing in itself’ can’t be known by science, we are free to believe in things like religion, the future and other such things, but there was a realm of experience that belonged to science that was empirical and that philosophy should do the same. Crowley read these works and changed a few premises to fit his description as we shall see. A more immediate reference to Kant is ‘philosophy has nothing to say and science can only suspend judgement.’

Crowley uses this split to justify his version of idealism that he believes is proven through illusion and perception, with the will as the active process of percpetion that is capable of manifesting spirits.

With all of this background we can see how Crowley did not arrive to his claim that ‘the spirits of the Goetia are portions of the human brain’ through the methods he describes, but rather he applied transcendental idealism to his explanation. The spirits to Crowley are the ‘things in themselves’ or in Fichtes terms ‘by positing its own limitation, first, as only a feeling, then as a sensation, then as an intuition of a thing, and finally as a summons of another person.’


Crowley’s references to will also bring other Kantian influenced philosophy into the frame. When he explains the ‘destruction of our enemies is to realise the illusion of duality, to excite compassion’, aside from his explanations of how these things-in-themselves, or active transcendental mechanisms which he calls spirits that are summoned through intuition, he seems to be revealing a link to Arthur Shopenhauer and Hegel. This will further elaborate on Akasha as an essence that is more than the finite modes of existents.

Hegel was a revolutionary philosopher who actually tried to describe the experience of the transcendental realm, or the thing in itself. Hegel claims that we are all ultimately one, there is one underlying reality and self-awareness is a necessary illusion that gives us the appearance of seperateness. Shopenhauer takes these metaphysics and declares there is a ‘will’ behind or around all things, an immamance, but it’s not like our individual will however, it is is more like an energy. In humans the will is the ‘will to life’ and it manifests usually as desire for satisfaction in a never ending cycle of suffering. Shopenhauer was a pessimist and concluded that the only basis for morality was compassion, as we are all interconnected as one, one cannot act with out causing action upon other beings around me. Shopenhauer was a notoriously cranky philosopher and despised women, something that Crowley would certainly have found attractive.

So to destroy one’s enemies by realising the illusion of duality follows this same logic.


I have long suspected for many years that Crowley was influenced greatly by German philosophy, all of the philosophers I have talked about lived and died before Crowley was born in 1875, Shopenhauer died only 15 years before Crowley was born.

Crowley percieves spirits in the same sense as Kantian transcendental idealism, with Fichtes’ take on intution and summoning. Crowley sees the spirits as active components of perception and of knowledge that occupy a noumenal world that can’t be known as a cause but can be accessed and retrieved through ceremony and intuition.

I personally see Crowleys’ explanation as unnecessary, as the same conclusions and knowledge can be accessed through the same metaphysics as previous philosphers before him. As I explained when I opened this thread, I am not trying to debunk or find out if spirits are real or not, I am only breaking down the content of what Crowley provides on it’s own terms.

Crowley even admits that ‘these practices are useless;but for the benefit of others less fortunate I give them to the world’. I don’t accept his apology afterwards as I have laid out this article it seems that he was hiding influences on his thought that would probably have been better applied with a different set of questions.

Psychology was just starting to build itself up as a human science and after Shopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud came along with a powerful materialism that focused on drives, which are possible to explain in terms of Crowley’s ‘spirits’, except they are not transcendental or from a noumenal realm, they are on a plane of immanance in this world.

If taken in regards to physical manifestation

If we are to improve what Crowley says to match the claim that Goetic spirits are ontologically objective, but manifest in this world not as part of the brain but as a seperate entity that can be observed by one or two people, then we can with charity explain it in a dialectical monistic way. Dialectical monism, or dualistic monism is the ontological view that reality is a whole but expressed necessarily in seperate parts. This is more akin to Spinoza’s panentheism – the one and the many, all is in god but god is more than nature and all material substances are finite modes of an infinite being, like God. This allows for spirits to exist as modes, they are less than god and part of nature. They are not beyond nature and don’t come from a transcendental realm, nor are they soley an aspect of a human brain. They can only be experienced through ritual ceremony however, but this does not mean they don’t exist prior to the experience.

Spirits exist with humans, however spirits can exist without them also, this makes humans contingent and not necessary to spirits, but spirits are a necessity of nature for humans. This is a statement that includes a oneness of duality, that reality is not one, or two, it is one and two. When humans call spirits, it is for matters that are necessary to humans, whereas spirits are concerned with necessities outside of human experience. Due to the fact there are limits on this relationship and that humans only have a contingent part to play, it is fair to say that spirits can be related to parts of the human mind in the forms of desires and satisfaction of desires. Thus, instead of ending up with a dualism or a monism, we can say that spirits are one and two things at once. They are ontologically objective because they exist independent of our experience, however they only have relevance when they are evoked through experience and are also ontologically subjective as well. Their effects on human desires are ontologically subjective, the knowledge of the symbols in the Goetia to call them is epistemically objective and the intuition, motives and personal will is epistemically subjective in the magician.

With the transcendental idealist interpretation, there is no ontologically objective form of the spirit, there is an ontologically subjective form from the thing-in-itself in the mind of the one who experiences the spirit, the knowledge of the symbols in the book is epistemically objective and the intuition and summoning, or information aquired by the spirit in the mind is epistemically subjective.

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What is Capitalism and how can we Destroy it? New Series!

Reference Guide to Capitalism

Continue reading What is Capitalism and how can we Destroy it? New Series!

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